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THE HEGSELMANN-KRAUSE DYNAMICS FOR CONTINUOUS AGENTS
AND A REGULAR OPINION FUNCTION DO NOT ALWAYS LEAD TO
CONSENSUS
EDVIN WEDIN1,2 AND PETER HEGARTY1,2
Abstract. We present an example of a regular opinion function which, as it evolves in accor-
dance with the discrete-time Hegselmann-Krause bounded confidence dynamics, always retains
opinions which are separated by more than two. This confirms a conjecture of Blondel, Hen-
drickx and Tsitsiklis.
1. Introduction
Recent years have seen an explosion in both the amount of data available to scientists of all
persuasions and the computing power necessary to run simulations of mathematical models.
There is a rapidly expanding vista for the application of mathematics to the life and social
sciences. One major theme of this effort is emergence, the name given to the idea that patterns
in the collective behaviour of large groups of interacting agents may be explicable even if each
individual is assumed to obey only rules which are both simple and local, the latter meaning
that each agent is only influenced by its close neighbours, in some appropriate metric. This
idea is mathematically appealing, as it suggests a preference for deducing interesting theorems
from simple hypotheses. Hence, even if the relevance of any particular mathematical model to
“reality” may be a difficult and controversial issue, there is at least the promise of some beautiful
new mathematical results and conjectures resulting from these efforts.
The field of opinion dynamics is concerned with how human agents modify their opinions on
social issues as a result of the influence of others. This paper is a contribution to the study of
a particularly elegant and well-known mathematical model, the bounded confidence model of
Hegselmann and Krause [7], or simply the HK-model for brevity. In the simplest formulation of
the model, we have a finite number, say N , of agents, indexed by the integers 1,2, . . . ,N . The
opinion of agent i is represented by a real number x(i), where the convention is that x(i) ≤ x(j)
whenever i ≤ j. The dynamics are as follows: There is a fixed parameter r > 0 such that, after
each unit of time, every individual replaces their current opinion by the average of those which
currently lie within distance r of themselves. This is summarised by the formula
(1.1) xt+1(i) =
1
|Nt(i)|
∑
j∈Nt(i)
xt(j),
where Nt(i) = {j : |xt(j) − xt(i)| ≤ r}. As the dynamics is obviously unaffected by rescaling
all opinions and the confidence bound r by a common factor, we can assume without loss of
generality that r = 1.
Note that the HK-model seems to implicitly assume that each agent is aware of the opinions
of all other agents, even if he chooses to ignore most of them when modifying his view. Hence
the agents do not really obey “local” rules in the sense described earlier. In one sense, this is
a matter of interpretation. For example, a conservatively inclined UK citizen may switch the
channel whenever a member of the Labour party is giving an interview, or my keep watching but
shake his head and mutter under his breath. In other words, the agent adopts strategies which
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both filter out unwelcome opinions and prevent him from being aware of them in the first place.
On the other hand, the HK-model clearly assumes that an agent is aware of all opinions within
his current confidence range. There are no restrictions imposed by, for example, geography,
which prevent certain agents from sharing opinions a priori. Other important features of the
model are that it is fully deterministic and that all agents act simultaneously. Hence the model
differs in important respects from other famous models of opinion dynamics such as classical
voter models [10] or the Deffuant-Weisbuch model [5].
The update rule (1.1) is certainly simple to formulate, though the simplicity is deceptive.
Associated to a given configuration (x(1), . . . ,x(N)) of opinions is a receptivity graph G, whose
nodes are the N agents and where an edge is placed between agents i and j whenever |x(i) −
x(j)| ≤ 1. The transition in the configuration from time t to time t + 1 is determined by this
graph at time t. However, it is clear from (1.1) that the graph will in general vary with time. In
algebraic terms, the dynamics are governed by a time-dependent stochastic matrix. This time
dependence is the basic reason why many beautiful conjectures about the HK-model remain
unresolved, as we shall now explain.
We begin with the necessary notation and terminology. The state space for a system of N
agents obeying the HK-dynamics is the set of non-decreasing functions x : {1,2, . . . ,N} → R,
equivalently, the set of vectors (x(1), · · · ,x(N)) ∈ RN such that x(i) ≤ x(j) whenever i ≤ j.
An equilibrium state is one such that |x(i) − x(j)| > 1 whenever x(i) 6= x(j). Clearly, once an
equilibrium state is reached, then the opinion of every agent will be frozen for all future time.
It is also easy to see that the converse holds: if xt+1(i) = xt(i) for all i, then xt must be an
equilibrium state. Any set of agents sharing a common opinion are referred to as a cluster. By a
slight abuse of terminology, the term“cluster”may refer either to the set of agents with a certain
opinion or the real number representing that opinion. Hence, a HK-system is in equilibrium
if and only if no two clusters are within unit distance of each other. The simplest kind of
equilibrium state is a consensus, in which there is only one cluster. Given a cluster c ∈ R, its
weight w(c) is the number of agents sharing opinion c. A stable equilibrium is one in which, for
any two clusters a and b,
(1.2) |b− a| ≥ 1 + min{w(a), w(b)}
max{w(a), w(b)} .
This last notion was introduced in [2], which is the paper that directly inspired the present
work.
The two fundamental facts about the HK-model are the following:
(A) Any initial state will evolve to equilibrium within a finite time.
(B) Even if the receptivity graph is initially connected, the subsequent equilibrium state need
not be a consensus.
Fact (A) seems to have been rediscovered several times over and there are a number of
different proofs in the literature. Indeed, the same fact has been proven for a wide class of
models of which HK is just one particularly simple example, see [4]. Some of the known proofs
of (A) give effective bounds for the time taken to reach equilibrium, as a function of the number
N of agents only. The best-known bound is O(N3), which was proven independently in [1] and
[9]. It is speculated1, however, that equilibrium is always reached within O(N) steps, and that
the worst-case scenario is given by the initial state2 EN = (1,2, . . . ,N). This is an important
open problem in the field.
1We purposely do not use the word “conjectured” here, as we have not seen this hypothesis explicitly stated
as a conjecture anywhere in the literature. On the other hand, several authors refer to the example of equally
spaced initial opinions, and we have not seen anyone suggest that there may be worse cases than this one.
2Simulations suggest that, for large N , the initial state EN reaches equilibrium in about cN steps, where c is
a constant slightly greater than 0.8.
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Regarding (B), it is easy to see that consensus may not be achieved if the initial distribution
of opinions is very uneven. For example, suppose we have 100 agents and the initial state is
(1.3) x0(i) =
 −1, 1 ≤ i ≤ 98,0, i = 99,
+1, i = 100.
At t = 1, the opinion of agent 99 will be pulled very close to −1, while agent 100 will only modify
his opinion to x1(100) = 1/2. Thus, agent 100 will now be isolated from everyone else and will
form a cluster by himself in the equilibrium configuration. What is more interesting is that
consensus may not emerge even when there is no such unevenness in the initial configuration.
The simplest example is the initial state E6. A direct computation shows that the resulting
equilibrium consists of clusters at 46131728 and
7483
1728 , each of weight three. At this point it seems
natural to ask what a “typical” equilibrium state looks like. In order to make this question
precise, let us fix a parameter L and suppose that the initial opinions x1(0), . . . ,xN (0) are
chosen independently and uniformly at random from the interval [0, L]. The following two
conjectures are supported by overwhelming numerical evidence:
Conjecture 1.1. With opinions chosen initially as just described, let pL,N denote the probability
that the resulting equilibrium is a consensus. Then there exists a critical value Lc
3 such that, as
N →∞, pL,N → 1 whenever L < Lc and pL,N → 0 whenever L > Lc.
Conjecture 1.2. With opinions chosen initially as described above, let qL,N denote the prob-
ability that the resulting equilibrium is stable, in the sense of (1.2). Then for any fixed L,
qL,N → 1 as N →∞.
We have not seen Conjecture 1.1 stated explicitly anywhere, though it is implicit in the
statements of many different authors. Conjecture 1.2 is a special case of Conjecture 1 in [3].
They conjecture that the equilibrium state is almost surely stable under the weaker assumption
that the initial opinions are chosen independently from any continuous and bounded pdf on
[0, L] with connected support, and not just the uniform distribution. Indeed, it is expected
that, when the initial distribution is uniform, then the clusters at equilibrium will typically
have about the same weight and hence, if (1.2) holds, will typically be separated by at least
two. This hypothesis is referred to in the literature as the 2r conjecture. We are not aware of
anyone having turned this hypothesis into a precise conjecture, however. The reason for this is
probably that, at least as far as can be told from simulations to date, the distribution of cluster
sizes arising from a uniform initial distribution of opinions appears to be quite subtle.
In an attempt to better understand the behaviour of the HK-model for a large number of
agents, Blondel, Hendrickx and Tsitsiklis introduced [2] a continuous agent version of the model.
Here the uncountably many agents are indexed by numbers in the closed interval [0, 1] and the
state space consists of non-decreasing, bounded functions x : [0, 1]→ R. The analogue of (1.1)
is
(1.4) xt+1(α) =
1
µ(Nt(α))
∫
Nt(α)
xt(β) dβ,
where Nt(α) = {β : |xt(β)− xt(α)| ≤ 1} and µ denotes Lebesgue measure. Of course, for (1.4)
to even make sense we must assume that the state space contains only Lebesgue measurable
functions. An equilibrium state in this setting is a function attaining only finitely many values,
such that the difference between any two such values exceeds one whenever both are attained
on sets of positive measure. Stable equilibrium can be defined as in (1.2), where now w(c) =
µ(x−1(c)), and the inequality is required to hold whenever both clusters have positive weight.
In particular, consensus means a constant function, whereas any equilibrium state which is not
a consensus is represented by a discontinuous function. It is natural to assume that the initial
state x0 is continuous, however. Intuitively, x0 should be injective and x
−1
0 should correspond
to the cdf in Conjecture 1.2. This suggests restricting attention to initial states which are C1.
3In [6], simulations are presented which suggest that LC is close to 5.
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On the other hand, there are simple examples where x0 ∈ C1 but x1 has corners. For example,
suppose x0(α) = 3α. An easy computation yields
(1.5) x1(α) =

3α+1
2 , 0 ≤ α ≤ 13 ,
3α, 13 ≤ α ≤ 23 ,
3α
2 + 1,
2
3 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Hence x1 is not differentiable at α =
1
3 and α =
2
3 . We shall assume henceforth that the initial
state is regular, by which we mean that it is almost everywhere C1, with strictly positive lower
and upper bounds on its derivative where it ex1ists. This is a slight strengthening of the notion
of regularity as defined in [3].
In contrast to the discrete case, it is not clear whether any initial state will reach equilibrium
in finite time. Indeed, since any continuous function will obviously remain so when updated
according to (1.4), no regular initial state can reach a non-consensus equilibrium in finite time.
In [2], it is conjectured that a regular initial state x0 will converge almost everywhere to a stable
equilibrium, that is: there is a stable equilibrium x∞ such that, for each ε > 0 there is a Tε > 0
such that µ({α : |xt(α) − x∞(α)| > ε}) < ε for all t > Tε. They prove a weaker statement
in [3], but this fundamental conjecture about the continuous agent model remains open. Note,
however, that Hendrickx and Olshevsky have recently [8] proven a corresponding conjecture for
another variation on the model where time is also treated as continuous.
Thus, for the continuous agent model, a regular initial state will reach equilibrium in finite
time if and only if that equilibrium is a consensus – more precisely, xt+1 will be constant if and
only if xt(1) − xt(0) ≤ 1. This brings us to perhaps the most curious aspect of the continuous
agent model, namely it is not obvious that there is any regular initial state which does not reach
consensus. The existence of such states was conjectured in [2], but they could give no example
with proof. More precisely, Conjecture 3 of [2] postulates the existence of a regular x0 such that
(1.6) xt(1)− xt(0) ≥ 2 for all t.
The motivation for this restriction is that they could prove that, if (1.6) holds, then xt is regular
for all t. Our contribution here will be to prove this conjecture:
Theorem 1.3. There exists a regular function x0 : [0, 1]→ R such that, if the sequence (xt)t∈N
is defined according to (1.4), then xt(1)− xt(0) > 2 for all t.
Section 2 contains a proof of this result and Section 3 contains a discussion of some open
problems.
2. Proof of Main Theorem
The opinion function to be described below will converge pointwise to a non-regular stable
state with 3 clusters of positive weight, and the construction can be extended to allow conver-
gence to (at least) any odd number of such clusters.
Figure 1. The shape to which the opinion functions will converge
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Figure 2. Some time invariant subspaces of I and the opinion space for a piece-
wise linear initial opinion function.
Let I = [0, 1]. To construct our initial state x0, we first partition the set I into closed intervals
A, B, C, D and E, each overlapping the next in exactly one point. For a small ε that will be
specified later, we also require |B| = |D| = ε2|C| and |C| = ε2|A| = ε2|E|, where | · | denotes the
length of an interval, so that the endpoints of the intervals lie symmetrically around the centre
c = 12 of C. We also define A = [0, ε], B = [ε, d + ε] and C = [d + ε, d + 2ε] for some d ∈ (1, 2)
to be subsets of the opinion space. How small ε needs to be will depend, among other things,
on the choice of d, so to save us some bookkeeping, we will fix d = 32 . These sets are fixed and
do not depend on time.
There is some freedom in the construction of the initial state, and in some places conditions
will be given along with an example. We will often present an example without explicit bounds
on how much it can be varied.
First of all, the initial opinion function x0 is defined to be anti-symmetric about c. By this
is meant that if coordinates were to be chosen so that c = 0 and x0(c) = 0, then x0 would be
odd. From this symmetry, it easily follows that xt(c) = x0(c) for all time steps t, and that the
anti-symmetry remains.
Second, x0 is defined so that x0(A) = A, x0(B) = B and x0(C) = C. This will give x0 the
shape of a “double S”, with a small plateau in the middle and two long tails, see Figure 1 . Not
only should x0 stay within these “boxes”, illustrated in Figure 2 , but we require also that the
derivative fulfil that x′0(α)|A ≤ e0 and x′0(α)|B ≥ s0 for suitable constants e0 and s0. In this
example, we will take x0 to be linear on all intervals A, B, C, D and E, and e0 and s0 to equal
the derivatives on A and B, respectively, so that e0 =
ε
|A| and s0 =
d
|B| .
To prove that, from the initial state x0, condition (1.6) will be satisfied, a sort of induction
will be used. For every time step, the average opinion for the agents in A will increase, and we
will prove that this increase is at most linear in the measure of the set of agents with opinion in
a certain subset of B. We will then show that this measure will shrink quickly enough for the
sum of the increments in A to converge, and thereby show that there will always be agents in
A with opinion less than ε, provided ε is chosen small enough. Because of symmetry, this will
imply the existence of agents in E with opinions greater than 2d+ 2ε, and since d > 1 this will
complete the proof.
Let At = x
−1
t ([0, 2ε]) and Bt = x
−1
t ([2ε, ε + d]) be the sets of agents with opinions in [0, 2ε]
and [2ε, ε + d], respectively, at time t, see Figure 3 . The reason for using 2ε instead of just ε
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Figure 3. Overview of the subsets of the agent space and the opinion space at
time t.
will become clear in the proof of Lemma 2.4 below. We also let At = xt(A). We will let A¯t
denote the average opinion on At at time t, and a vertical bar with a subscript will denote the
restriction of a function to the set in the subscript.
The precise assumptions on the function at time t are the following:
I: A ⊆ At.
II: B ⊇ Bt.
III: At ⊆ A.
IV: There is an et such that x
′
t|A ≤ et.
V: There is an st such that x
′
t|Bt ≥ st.
VI: ε− A¯t > 2ε2.
Note that with, from our definition of x0, it is clear that all but the last assumption hold for
t = 0. For the last assumption to hold ε must be small enough, and it is easy to check that
ε ≤ 14 is enough at t = 0.
Under these assumptions we will prove the following lemmas:
Lemma 2.1. Only the agents who at time t have opinions in At+1 = {α+1 : α ∈ At} may end
up in Bt+1, and At+1 ⊂ A. An immediate consequence of this is that At+1 ⊇ At and Bt+1 ⊆ Bt.
Proof of Lemma 2.1. We simply examine the two extreme agents in x−1t (At + 1) to see that
these will have opinions on opposite sides of B at time t+ 1. Let
βt = x
−1
t (min At + 1), γt = x−1t (max At + 1).
Firstly, we observe that the agent γt can see all agents in B and C, some agents in D, and
one agent in A. For the function
x˜t(α) =
{
3
2ε+ d, if α ∈ C,
0, else
we thus have that
(2.1) xt+1(γt) ≥ 1|Nt(γt)|
∫
Nt(γt)
x˜t(α)dα ≥
|C|(32ε+ d)
|B|+ |C|+ |D| =
|C|(32ε+ d)
|C|(2ε2 + 1) ≥ ε+ d
6
if4 ε ≤ 14(
√
13 − 3), so xt+1(γt) 6∈ B. The second inequality follows precisely from the fact
that γt cannot see any agents in D, and only one agent in A that is also in B, which implies
Nt(γt) ⊆ B ∪ C ∪D.
Secondly, we observe that the agent βt can see all agents in A, B and C, and some of the
agents in D. The function
xˆt(α) =

A¯t, if α ∈ At,
ε+ d, if α ∈ Bt,
3
2ε+ d, if α ∈ (B \ (At ∪Bt)) ∪ C,
2ε+ 2d, if α ∈ D
has averages greater than or equal to xt on all the subsets of I that can be seen from βt. We
can thereby use xˆt to get the following bound:
xt+1(βt) ≤ 1|Nt(βt)|
∫
A∪B∪C∪D
xˆt(α)dα ≤
≤ |At|A¯t + ε
4|At|(d+ ε) + ε2|At|(32ε+ d) + ε4|At|(2ε+ 2d)
|At| <
< A¯t + 3ε
5 + 3dε4 +
3
2
ε3 + dε2 < A¯t + 2ε
2 < ε 6∈ B(2.2)
for at least4 ε ≤ 110 , where the last inequality is true according to Assumption VI. This also
proves that At+1 ⊆ A.
We have now shown that xt+1(βt) and xt+1(γt) both lie outside B, and monotonicity now
completes the proof.
Lemma 2.2. The increase in the mean opinion from At at time t to At+1 at time t + 1 is at
most linear in |Bt|. More precisely, A¯t+1 − A¯t ≤ 4 |Bt||A| .
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Lemma 2.1 tells us that At+1 ⊇ At, and this allows us to write At+1 =
At unionsq (At+1 \At), a disjoint union of two non-empty sets.
As for the first of these sets, the part of Bt that is visible from At has opinions that do not
exceed 1 + 2ε, and so the average of xt+1 over At at time t+ 1 will be
(At)t+1 ≤
|A|A¯t + |Bt|(1 + 2ε)
|At|+ |Bt| < A¯t +
|Bt|(1 + 2ε)
|At| < A¯t +
2|Bt|
|A| ,
where the two last inequalities use that A ⊆ At, which is true by Assumption I. Note that this
bound is simply a bound on the opinion of the rightmost agent in At at time t + 1, that also
bounds the whole average because of monotonicity.
The average of xt+1 over At+1 \At at time t+ 1 is certainly at most 2ε, by definition of the
set At+1. We also know from Lemma 2.1 that At+1 \ At ⊆ Bt, and we thereby get the total
average
A¯t+1 ≤
∫
At+1
xt+1(α)dα
|At+1| ≤
|At|(At)t+1 + |A1+t \At|(2ε)
|At|+ |A1+t \At| ≤
≤ (At)t+1 +
|Bt|(2ε)
|A| ≤ A¯t +
2|Bt|
|A| +
|Bt|(2ε)
|A| ≤ A¯t +
4|Bt|
|A| ,
as long as ε ≤ 1.
Lemma 2.3. The derivative of xt+1 on A is bounded from above:
x′t+1|A ≤ et+1 =
2
|A|
et
st
.
Provided st is big enough, which we will show is the case, this implies the much weaker statement
et+1 ≤ et.
4To compute this bound we use d = 3
2
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Lemma 2.4. The derivative of xt+1 on Bt+1 is bounded from below:
x′t+1 ≥ st+1 =
ε
2|A|
st
et
.
This gives us a bound on the size of Bt+1:
|Bt+1| ≤ d
st+1
.
In the proofs of Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 the following additional lemma will be used:
Lemma 2.5. Let xt be a regular opinion function on I such that xt(1)− xt(0) > 2 and define
the functions ut, vt, wt : I → I as follows:
ut(α) =
{
0, if xt(α) ≤ xt(0) + 1,
x−1t (xt(α)− 1), otherwise,
vt(α) =
{
1, if xt(α) ≥ xt(1)− 1,
x−1t (xt(α) + 1), otherwise,
wt(α) = vt(α)− ut(α),
Then the updated function xt+1 is regular with derivative, where it exists, given by
(2.3) x′t+1(α) =
1
wt(α)
[
u′t(α) · (1 + xt+1(α)− xt(α)) + v′t(α) · (1 + xt(α)− xt+1(α))
]
.
Proof. That xt+1 is regular was proven in Lemma 4 of [2]. Assuming xt+1, ut, vt and wt are
differentiable at α, we can compute as follows:
We first use the definition in (1.4) along with the product rule for derivatives to get
(2.4) x′t+1(α) =
−w′t(α)
(wt(α))2
∫ vt(α)
ut(α)
xt(β)dβ +
1
wt(α)
d
dα
(∫ vt(α)
ut(α)
xt(β)dβ
)
.
The first term simplifies to
(2.5)
[u′t(α)− v′t(α)]xt+1(α)
wt(α)
and, by the chain rule, the second term can be rewritten as
(2.6)
1
wt(α)
[
xt(vt(α)) · v′t(α)− xt(ut(α)) · u′t(α)
]
.
But by definition of the functions ut and vt, we have
xt(vt(α)) =
{
xt(α) + 1, if xt(α) ≤ xt(1)− 1,
1, otherwise,
xt(ut(α)) =
{
xt(α)− 1, if xt(α) ≥ xt(0) + 1,
0, otherwise.
We would like to substitute the values xt(vt(α)) = xt(α) + 1 and xt(ut(α)) = xt(α) − 1 into
(2.6). The former doesn’t hold when xt(α) > xt(1)−1, but in this range vt(α) = 1 so v′t(α) = 0,
so we can make the substitution anyway and it doesn’t matter. A similar reasoning applies to
the latter substitution. Hence the right-hand side of (2.6) simplifies to
(2.7)
v′t(α) · (xt(α) + 1)− u′t(α) · (xt(α)− 1)
wt(α)
.
Substituting (2.5) and (2.7) into (2.4) leads after a little computation to (2.3).
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Proof of Lemma 2.3. For agents α in A we have that ut(α) = 0, so u
′
t(α) = 0. Using Lemma
2.5 this gives
(2.8) x′t+1(α) =
1 + xt(α)− xt+1(α)
wt(α)
v′t(α)
for all α ∈ A. From Assumption III we know that At ⊆ A, so we know that all agents in A can
see each other and at least some agents in Bt, but no agents beyond Bt, so wt(α) > |A|.
To get a bound on v′t(α), we use the definition of vt, the chain rule, and the formula for the
derivative of an inverse function:
t(α) =
d
dα
x−1t (xt(α) + 1) = x
′
t(α) ·
1
x′t(x
−1
t (xt(α) + 1))
=
x′t(α)
x′t(vt(α))
.
To bound this, first note that α ∈ A implies x′t(α) ≤ et. Second, note that since we assume
At ⊆ A, it follows that xt(vt(α)) = [1, 1 + ε]. In particular, vt(α) ∈ Bt, and thus x′t(vt(α)) ≥ st.
Putting this together results in the bound
(2.9) v′t(α) ≤
et
st
.
Finally we observe that 1 + xt(α) − xt+1(α) ≤ 2 holds trivially, and we can now insert this
and (2.9) into (2.8) to obtain
x′t+1(α) ≤
2
|A|
et
st
,
as desired.
Proof of Lemma 2.4. First observe that since both the terms within brackets in (2.3) are posi-
tive, only one of them is needed to construct a lower bound for the derivative:
(2.10) x′t+1(α) ≥
1
wt(α)
u′t(α)[1 + xt+1(α)− xt(α)].
We know from Assumption III and symmetry that no agent in Bt can see as far as E, so
wt(α) ≤ |A ∪ B ∪ C ∪ D| < 2|A|. The first statement in Lemma 2.1 and the definition of Bt
together assure us that (1+xt+1(α)−xt(α)) ≥ ε: All the agents in Bt+1 must have had opinions
in At + 1 at time t, or they would have ended up outside Bt+1 after the update, according to
Lemma 2.1. This is the motivation for using 2ε in the definitions of At and Bt. It also lets
us use et and st in a way similar to what was done in the proof of Lemma 2.3 to get that
u′t(α) =
x′t(α)
x′t(ut(α))
≥ stet . Applying these inequalities to (2.10) gives the result.
The upper bound on the size of Bt+1 simply comes from multiplying the inverse of the bound
on the derivative with the height of Bt+1, which we know is constantly d−ε < d by construction.
Proof of Theorem 1.3. To begin with note that, if we were to rescale the inteval I it would not
affect any of our arguments. Hence, in order to simplify notation, we rescale so that |A| = 1.
We would like Assumptions I-VI to be true for all time steps, for then we would be done.
Lemmas 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4 show that Assumptions I-V can be made for time t+ 1 if they hold for
time t, provided that ε is small enough. Take ε = 1100 . This is small enough for all the previous
arguments to go through, and will be small enough for the arguments to follow.
As for Assumption VI, Lemma 2.2 tells us that the mean value A¯t on the increasing sequence
of sets At depends linearly on the sizes |Bt|. From monotonicity and the fact that At ⊃ A by
Assumption I, we know that the average on A at time t is less than A¯t, so an upper bound on
A¯t will be enough to finish the proof.
To obtain a bound on ε that guarantees convergence of the values A¯t, we will use Lemmas
2.3 and 2.4, mostly the weaker statement in Lemma 2.3. At time 0, assuming |A| = 1, we have
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e0 = ε and s0 =
d
ε4
. At time 1 we have e1 =
2ε5
d and s1 =
d
2ε4
, and this will be enough to
complete the argument as we get the bound
st+1 =
ε
2et
st ≥ ε
2e1
st =
d
4ε5
st,
for t ≥ 1, and hence, by iteration
st ≥
(
d
4ε5
)t−1
s1,
for t ≥ 1. This might appear like circular reasoning at a first glance: We show that the
variables st are growing using the fact that the variables et are not, but this in turn depends
on the variables st being big enough. To see that the argument actually holds, note that the
inequalities can be checked one time step at a time, and that the correctness of every step
follows from the previous one.
With the bound on |Bt+1| from Lemmas 2.4 and 2.2 we get that
A¯t+1 − A¯t ≤ 4Bt ≤ 4 d
s1
(
4ε5
d
)t−1
= 8ε4
(
4ε5
d
)t−1
,
for t ≥ 1. If t = 0 we instead get that
A¯1 − A¯0 ≤ 4|B0| = 4ε4,
which lets us sum up the bounds on the increments and obtain
lim
t→∞ A¯t ≤
ε
2
+ 4ε4 + 8ε4
1
1−
(
4ε5
d
) < ε− 2ε2,
where the last inequality holds at least for ε = 1100 . This completes the proof.
3. Discussion
When thinking about how to construct an example to prove Theorem 1.3, we first considered
a ”single-S” shape, without the narrow plateau in the middle, but with the height of the narrow
strip connecting the two tails still being above two. We could not prove that the updates of
such an initial state would also satisfy (1.6), though we suspect this is the case. In fact, what we
think happens when the function is updated is that a narrow plateau will form in the middle,
thus yielding the ”double-S” shape of the function in Section 2 as an intermediate step in the
evolution.
In any case, there should be even simpler examples of regular functions which satisfy (1.6).
Indeed, Conjecture 1.1 suggests the following corresponding hypothesis for the continuous agent
model:
Conjecture 3.1. Let x0 : [0, 1] → R be a non-decreasing linear function. Then there is a
critical value L∗c such that the updates xt satisfy (1.6) whenever x0(1) − x0(0) > L∗c , whereas
x0 will evolve to consensus when x0(1) − x0(0) < L∗c . Moreover, L∗c = Lc, the critical value in
Conjecture 1.1.
In fact, we also conjecture there will not be evolution to consensus at the critical value L∗c .
Intuitively, the reason for this is as follows. For any continuous x0, the ranges xt(1) − xt(0)
of the updates will be strictly decreasing with t as long as we don’t have consensus. The ”2r
conjecture” suggests that, given a linear x0, there will eventually be consensus if and only if the
range of opinions shrinks to strictly below two at some point. Hence, at L = L∗c , we should
converge almost everywhere to an equilibrium consisting of two clusters of equal measure and
separated by exactly two.
This leads in turn to another obvious remaining question, namely whether it is possible for a
regular initial state to fail to satisfy (1.6) and yet never reach consensus.
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